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EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Under what circumstances are they imposed and should
they be allowed?
Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages are said to
be damages over and above compensation, assessed for the
purpose of punishing the defendant wrong-doer where he is
guilty of actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression,
wantonness, recklessness, or fraud. A New York case
gives as the basis for exemplary damages the moral culpability of the defendant.'
As a concise description it is said that exemplary damages are compensation for wrongs done with a bad motive.
This is not the case with ordinary compensation for damages even though the wrongful act was done by mistake if
the act was done in good faith.
When, however, -an act is done with a wanton disregard for the plaintiff's rights or in such a way as to constitute an outrage or insult, many jurisdictions will allow the
'Hamilton vs. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 53 N. Y. 25, 6&N. W. 975.
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plaintiff to recover what is called exemplary, punitive or
vindictive damages, which terms are used interchangeably and are practically synonymous. This principle seems
to have been sanctioned in Bible times as set out in Exodus
ch. 21, 22, and quoted with approval in a Pennsylvania
2
case.
Mr. Justice Gray of the U. S. Supreme Court recites
that an early English court approved of the awarding of
exemplary damages as follows: "Damages are designed not
only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as
a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detest of the
jury to the action itself," or as is said in a Pa. case, when4
ever there has been oppression or vindictiveness.
In a Ky. case the court says with apparent reason, "If
trespassers were bound to pay in damages no more than the
exact value of the property forceably taken and converted
by them, there would be no motive created by the operation
of law to induce them to desist and abstain from invading
the rights of others. To furnish such a motive smart money
is allowed."" In a N. H. case the court says, "Exemplary
damages may in certain cases encourage prosecutions
where compensation for private injury would not repay the
trouble and expense of the proceedings."
"The rule has
been held to apply in all actions of tort-in actions for personal injury, in cases of wilful injury to property, in slander,
libel, seduction, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
and in actions of tort founded on negligence amounting to
misconduct and recklessness." 7 "A corporation has the same

2

Auer vs. Longstreet, 10 Pa. 148.

3

Wilkes vs. Wood, Lofft 1, 18, 19, 19 How St. Trials 1153-1i67.
Nagle vs. Mattison, 34 Pa. 48.
5
Tyson vs. Ewing, 3 J. J. Marsh 186.
6Hopkins vs. Railroad, 36 N. H. 9-72 Am. Dec. 287.
7
Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. vs. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
right to recover exemplary damages as an individual for a
malicious and oppressive trespass committed upon its property."8
In matters of procedure it is held that "It is no objection to the allowance of such damages that the declaration
does not allege that negligence was wilful and wanton 9 or
malicious."' 0 "An excessive battery is an answer to a plea
of son assault demesne, and if wantonly or maliciously inflicted, subjects the party making it to the same liability to
exemplary damages as if he had been the original wrongdoer.""
The cases do not always require the proof of actual
malice, and malice may be inferred or there may exist malice in law which "refers to that state of mind which is reckless of law and of the legal rights of the citizen, in a person's conduct towards that citizen.'

12

It is held in suits for libel that "if the publication is
libelous per se exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of express malice" i s and "if it is not so libelous
the falsity of it is sufficient proof of malice to sustain such
damages if the jury award them."
In some jurisdictions if actual damages have been sustained, then there may be an award for mental suffering or
offended feelings which holdings would seem to be more
sound than those which allow vindictive or punitive damages which are not based on damages in any sense of the
-Nord.
The courts of Michigan, very properly, it would seem,
do not award exemplary damages by that name nor as a
8

International etc. R. C. vs. Tel. & Tel. Co. 69 Tex. 277.
Wilkinson vs. Drew, 75 Me. 360.
lOLyddon vs. Dose, 81 Mo. App. 64.
"Philadelphia etc. R. Co. vs. Larkin, 47 Md. 28.
"2Willis vs. Miller, 29 Fed. Rep. 238.
"3Wood vs. Hilbish, 23 Mo. App. 389.
9
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punishment, but rather as compensation for injured feelings
in aggravated cases.' 4
It is said in Vermont, Miss., Ky., Ill., Mo., N. Y., R. I.,
Tenn., Wis., Ala., Md., N. D., N. C., and Me. that punitory
damages cannot be claimed as a matter of right and in such
jurisdictions if exemplary damages are ever allowed it is a
matter of discretion with the court.
In some jurisdictions the wealth, or rather the reputation for wealth and social standing of the defendant may be
taken into account by the jury in making up its verdict on
the ground that an insult or injury committed by a person
of high standing in the community hurts more than an injury from a person of no reputation, and further, on the additional ground that a small verdict against such a person
would be very little punishment, while such verdict against
a person of very limited means might be a very heavy punishment."5
Among the objections urged against the allowance of
exemplary damages are the following:First. In a criminal proceeding the complaint is issued
under the oath of the complainant, but this is not the case
in the commencement of a civil action even where exemplary damages may be awarded against the defendant, although such damages are in the nature of a punishment.
Second. Although a person may have been compelled
to pay exemplary damages in a civil suit which really
amounts to punishment, he may again be tried and punished as the result of a conviction in a criminal action, thus
contrary to the Constitutional prohibition be placed twice
in jeopardy for the same offence.
Third. As to degree of proof which in all criminal
cases must convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
'4Ford vs. Cheever, 105 Mich, 679.
15 Brown vs. Evans, 17 Federal Rep. 912. McBride vs. McLaughlin,
5 Watts 375.
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while in a civil case where exemplary damages are allowed
the proof of the accusation need only be established by a
fair preponderance of the evidence.
Fourth. The particular circumstance or feature which
would entitle the plaintiff to recover exemplary damage in
a civil case does not need to be explicitly set out, while in
a criminal proceeding all such matters are set forth in the
indictment.
Fifth. In the civil suit the defendant may be compelled
to testify against himself, which is not the case in a criminal prosecution.
Sixth. In the civil case depositions may be introduced
against the defendant, which is not allowed in a criminal action where adverse witnesses meet face to face.
Seventh. In civil suits the juries are not limited as to
the amount they may inflict as punishment, while in a sentence as a result of a conviction for a crime the fine which
may be imposed is fixed within certain limits.
Eighth. No official has the power to remit the amount
of exemplary damages while there is the pardoning power
in criminal sentences or fines.
Ninth. Exemplary damages are in their nature vindictive and are not paid to the plaintiff as compensation or
on account of anything that may be due him, and
Tenth. That being the case, the allowance of such
damages to be recovered by the plaintiff would have a tendency to multiply actions, which is not desirable.
What may take the place of exemplary damages, or in
a measure at least serve the same purpose? Where the injury inflicted is done by the defendant in a vindictive, wanton or revengeful spirit much mental suffering is inflicted
upon the plaintiff, his feelings are unnecessarily injured and
indignity is imposed upon him, and in a proper case damages which are really compensatory should be awarded to
the plaintiff. Thus, actual compensatory damages in such
cases may, in a measure, take the place of exemplary damages.
ROBERT W. LYMAN.
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MOOT COURT
SLOAN VS. MILLER
Landlord and Tenant -

of Covenants -

Lease -

Covenants -

Alterations -

Breach

Right to Pursue Two Remedies,

Ejectment and Increase of Rent
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sloan leased a building to Miller for one year. He agreed not
to make any alterations. The lease provided that if this or other
provisions were violated, the rent, originally $50 a month, should be
increased to V75. It also provided that for such breach Sloan should
be able to enter an ejectment and confer a judgment therein. Alterations were made and suit was brought for increased rent, since the
alterations were made. An ejectment is also brought six months after
the alterations were made and judgment is confessed by the plaintiff
under the provisions of the lease. Miller asked the court to strike off
the judgment in ejectment, alleging that the double penalty for the
alterations was not allowable.
Clarke, for Plaintiff.
Bobick, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Dilley, J. From the facts of this case it appears that the lease
from Sloan to Miller provided for a penalty of an increase in rent if
Miller should make alterations. It also provided for the entry of an
ejectment and confessed judgment. The defendant contends that
Miller made alterations, sued for the increased rent, and also brought
ejectment and confessed judgment. The Defendant contends that
the double penalty was not allowable. We think that, under the facts
of the case it was. The latest case on this subject, Stevenson vs.
Dersam, 275 Pa. 412, is on all fours with this case. In it the court,
in referring to a lease which provided for the right to demand additional rent in case of breach, and also authorized the entry of judgment in case of violations of a covenant or agreement says, "The
remedies which are reserved are cumulative and both may be resorted to."

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

'97

The defendant in his argument relies on the decisions to the effect that if the lessor does an act which recognizes the subsistence of
the relation of landlord and tenant, such as the acceptance of rent,
the right to declare a forfeiture of the lease is waived, Swartz vs. Bixler, 261 Pa. 282; Newman vs. Rutter, 8 Watts 51. These cases are distinguishable. In the case at bar the plaintiff did not accept the rent
from the defendant, but was forced to sue for it under the clause
providing for an increase in rent in case of a breach; finally bringing
ejectment. If the defendant had tendered rent to the plaintiff and
he had accepted it the decision of the case would rest on other
grounds.
We hold that under the terms of the lease the plaintiff was
authorized to resort to both the remedy of additional rent and that
of ejectment. We must therefore dismiss the defendant's motion to
open the judgment in ejectment.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The parties have agreed that, if any alteration in the premises
should be made by the defendant, the rent should be seventy-five
dollars a month, instead of fifty dollars. Such an agreement is enforceable, and seventy-five dollars a month, after the alteration,
would be reasonable, so long as the tenant is permitted to remain in
possession. Another provision is that for breach of the agreement, an
ejectment can be brought, and judgment therein confessed by lessor.
There can be a recovery of seventy-five dollars per month, until the
ejection of the tenant. After that the agreement for rent is superseded.
It is supposed by the tenant that because of the increase of rent,
resort to the ejectment is not permissible. This is not the view of
the Supreme Court in Stevenson vs. Dersam, 275 Pa. 412, where it is
said that "the remedies are cumulative, and both may be resorted to."
This does not mean that, after ejectment by one process, there can
be a recovery of any rent for the time following.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
JONES VS. DIMMICK
Equity - Building Restrictions Creating an Easement - Remedy for
Violation of Restriction-Injunction-Agreement to Forfeit
a Certain Sum in Case of Violation No Bar
to Obtaining Injunction

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jones and Dimmick owned contiguous lots in a borough. In
consideration of $300 paid by Jones, Dimmick agreed under seal
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never to erect any structure on his lot within eight feet of the division line, and to allow Jones and his heirs to use this strip as an alley. Jones erected a house and continued to use the alley, for six
years. The agreement contained the stipulation that for the faithful
observance of it, Dimmick binds himself on the penalty of $400. At
the end of six years Dimmick is erecting a house so close to the
boundary as to leave an open space of only three feet. This is a bill
to enjoin against the violation of the agreement. Defendant cohtends that plainitff's only redress is the enforcement of the penalty.
Mclnroy, for Plaintiff.
Curtze, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Miss Ainey, J. The written agreement of Dimmick not to build
within eight feet of Jones' line and to allow Jones and his heirs to
use the strip reserved as an alley, creates an easement in favor of
Jones. The proper remedy for obstruction of an easement is injunction, the reason being the inadequacy of the remedy at law, 19 C. J.
255. "From the nature of easements their disturbance, if other than
temporary, is necessarily destructive, and because the easement is always connected with the use of real property, it is generally per se
possessed with the peculiar quality which is not adequately to be paid
for in damages, Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (2nd ed.) v.5, sec.
544. No amount of money can scarcely replace the loss to this plaintiff of ingress and egress to his own property.
It is alleged, however, that the plaintiff has signed away his
equitable remedy by stipulating in the contract an amount of damages which would compensate such loss. For the faithful observance
of the contract, Dimmick binds himself in the penalty of $400. The
distinction between penalties and liquidated damages often is not
easy of determination and the rule is that the intention of the parties
must prevail, "yet great reluctance is shown in construing as liquidated damages, a sum expressly called a penalty by the parties,"
Sedgwick, 1 Damages sec. 411, (8th ed.). The distinction is clear in
the cases cited, Mellon vs. Oliver, 256 Pa. 209, and Heckman's Estate,
236 Pa. 1939. In the former in which the parties bind themselves in
the penal sum of $200 to be paid by the party delinquent to the party
performant, it was held that the penalty fixed was intended as security for performance, not as a substitute for it, and did not deprive
the plaintiff of a remedy in equity." In the latter the agreement not
only recites the sum as liquidated damages, but expressly provides
that in case of breach, "all the rights under the agreement shall be
at an end." The terms specifically relinquish other remedy.
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The wording of the contract in our case is as unequivocal as that
of Mellon vs. Oliver, supra, and since the hardship upon the plaintiff
is of a nature not to be compensated in damages, this court will enjoin the interference with his right.
The mutuality doctrine is inapplicable in these circumstances. It
is true that a court will not grant specific performance to a plaintiff and at the same time leave the defendant to the legal remedy of
damages for possible future breach of the contract on the plaintiff's
part, 36 Cyc. 622. No such possibility can arise in this case. The
plaintiff has fully performed. As for obligation, mutuality sufficient
in law is sufficient in a suit to secure specific performance.
Bill for injunction sustained.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The plaintiff has bought for $300, and has secured a grant of
an easement over the defendant's land. That the latter may be compelled by injunction, to refrain from interfering with this easement
requires no citations of authorities. Nor does the fact that Dimmick.
the defendant has bound himself to observe his agreement by a penalty of $400, lead to the conclusion that the parties intended that for
a breach or a total renunciation of Dimmick's obligation, it was understood that $400 should be the price. Such a stipulation is virtually
nothing. The payment of the $400 could not be coerced, and at the
same time other remedies pursued. Nor can we regard what is termed a "penalty of $400" a liquidation of damages and infer a waiver of
all other remedies, Mellon vs. Oliver's Estate, 256 Pa. 209.
We approve of this issue of the injunction by the learned court
below. Appeal dismissed.

KARRFORD VS. FIRE INS. CO.
Fire Insurance

-

Husband and Wife

-

Nature of Estate Required

by 'Unconditional and Sole Ownership' Clause in Policy

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Insurance for $5000 on a house. It was totally destroyed by fire.
The policy provided that it should be void if the interest of the insured was not "the unconditional and sole ownership." The house
had been bought by the husband of the plaintiff and paid for with
his money. He declared however that he had bought the home for
her. The deed named him as grantee. The trial court has held the

zoo

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

policy void. After the conveyance the husband repeatedly declared
that the house was his wife's. No contradictory statement had ever
been made by him. Appeal.
Kernan, or Plaintiff.
Beckley, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Pottash, J. The contract provided that the policy was to be void
unless the interest of the insured was to be sole and unconditional
ownership, and as the plaintiff was not the owner of the property,
this claim is relied on by counsel for defendant to defeat recovery.
The clause in question is a common one in fire insurance policies
and the reports of this state are replete with decisions construing it.
It was uniformly held to be a representation and not a warranty, and
that the defendant could not avoid the policy therefore unless he
was injured by the misrepresentation, Imperial Fire Insurance Co. vs.
Dienham, 117 Pa. 460.
But this line of decisions is apparently overthrown by the decision of the Superior Court in Lehman vs. Lancaster Fire Ins. Co. in
45 Sup. 375.
The facts of the case are in confusion and stated conversely in
syllabus and in the opinion of the court. Nevertheless, the court
holds that the plaintiff cannot recover where the "sole and unconditional ownership" clause is violated, and it follows therefore the decision in this case must be for the defendants.
Plaintiff relies on the fact that the husband declared the property
was to be hers, as making her the sole and unconditional owner. But
we cannot accede to this view. A mere declaration by the real owner is not enough to pass any direct interest. It is a mere promise
and plaintiff has a bare expectancy that the promise will be fulfilled.
It is remarked, in Lehman vs. Lancaster Fire Ins. Co., supra, that
the wife has an insurable interest in the husband's property, but of
course this will not fulfill the ownership clause. Were it not for the
decision above, we would think that the wife has not such an interest
which if destroyed would result in direct and inevitable loss to her.
Her interest in her husband's property is contingent on her survival
of him, 26 C. J. page 25. However we must adhere to the doctrine
laid down by the above case. Appeal dismissed.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The house was bought by Mr. Karrford. He paid the price. He
was named in the deed as grantee. Mrs. Karrford has obtained a
policy, in which she declares that she is the unconditional and sole
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owner. The declaration of the husband that he had bought the house
for her, would not transfer the legal title to her, or create an equitable estate in the land. We think the conclusion sound that the condition on which the defendant assumed liability has not been fulfilled,
and the judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
HOLMES VS. JONES
Foreign Attachment -

Conveyance by Brother to Sister -

Proper

Method by Which to Proceed on a Foreign Attachment
Against Property Alleged to Have Been
Fraudulently Conveyed

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jones, a resident of New Jersey, had owned land in Pennsylvania. He contracted a debt of $5000 towards Holmes, also a resident
of New Jersey. Holmes sued him in New Jersey. obtaining a judgment, but finding no property in that state adequate to pay the debt,
began a foreign attachment of the land in Pennsylvania. The right
to maintain this attachment is denied on the ground that six (6)
months before its issue, Jones had conveyed the land to his sister in
payment of a debt due her. The court refused to quash the attachment, holding that the former ownership of the land by Jones would
sustain an atttachment, the purpose being to contest the validity of
the conveyance, as against Jones' creditors.
Whitten, for Plaintiff.
Sheely, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Haynes, J. The case at bar involves the conveyance of property
from brother to sister; said conveyance being claimed by appellants
to be in fraud of creditors.
This case is governed by Act of May 21, 1921, P. L. 1045. Said
Act provides in Sec. 9 that "where a conveyance or obligation is
fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured
may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration
without notice of the fraud at the time of purchase, disregard conveyance and attach or levy upon property conveyed. Sec. 3 also provided that an antecedent debt is fair consideration.
The latest case in Pennsylvania pertaining to this subject is that
of American Trust Co. vs. Kaufman, 276 Pa. 35 (1923). Said case
holds a conveyance by husband to wife which defeats rights of cred-
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itors is presumptively fraud, and the burden of proof rests upon the
defendants to show nominal consideration and absolute fairness in
their dealings, towards the creditors of the grantor.
The case at bar is identical in point of fact with the aforesaid
case; except our case concerns the conveyance of land from brother
to sister in place of husband to wife. This Court is of the opinion
that this fact alone creates a very material difference from the one
at bar, and as for taking it as a precedent can give it no weight,
whatever, since the relationship of brother and sister can in no wise
be reconciled with that of husband and wife.
This Court is further of the opinion, that there is nothing unusual
about this transaction between said brother and sister or any other
near relatives; except where otherwise proved by a sufficient amount
of evidence. Cannot relatives, the same as other individuals incur
debts towards each other, however unwise it might be? If such were
the law, that all transactions between brother and sister and near
relatives were to be looked upon with a suspicious eye by the court,
it would be a most unequitable state of circumstances, and would
tend to bring about a multiplicity of suits, as one can readily see.
If this were the case, a sister could not accept payment by means
of a conveyance of land from a brother without fear of being brought
into Court and being the recipient of great hardship and inconvenience, merely to show there was no conspiracy between them for the
purpose of defrauding the creditors of the grantor. As the learned
counsel for the defence stated, business dealings between parents,
children, and other near relatives are not per se fraudulent, but can
only be made so by a preponderence of evidence, and therefore must
be treated as any other transactions between ordinary debtors and
creditors, Reehling vs. Byers, 94 Pa. 316 (1880).
The plaintiff failed to show by any degree of proof, whatever,
that the defendant was acting in a manner to defraud his creditors.
Therefore, the attachment will be quashed and the decision of the
lower court reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A judgment has been obtained in N. J. by Holmes against Jones.
Intending to reach land in Pennsylvania owned by Jones, Holmes has
sued on the judgment in this state, in the form of foreign attachment,
he not being able to serve process otherwise than by attachment on
the debtor who remains out of Pennsylvania.
It is said that the land attached is not Jones' and hence that the
attachment will not lie. We do not conceive that when a dispute
exists, whether a conveyance by the debtor, was bona fide or not, the
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court must investigate under a motion to quash. Such a question
should be determined by a jury, and in a contest between the party
who has acquired, by sheriff's sale, the title of the debtor, and the
party who claims by conveyance from the debtor. A jury will not sit
in judgment in the motion to quash the attachment. The attachment
must proceed in the ordinary way, and if it results in judgment for
the attaching creditor, and if, under the attachment, a sale of the
land takes place, the respective rights of the creditor and of the
debtor's grantee will be determined in ejectment.
The order quashing the attachment must be reversed, and the
attachment must proceed in the usual way. Hence the order is reversed and set aside, and precedendo awarded.

COMMONWEALTH VS. JENKS
Criminal Law - Evidence - Husband and Wife - Competency of a
Witness Who Secured His Evidence Through Aid of Wife
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Indictment for larceny of goods belonging to X. X suspected
Jenks and went to his house to accuse him. He was not present but
Jenks' wife displayed some of the stolen goods, identified as some of
the articles belonging to X. X, as a witness was permitted to testify
to the finding of the goods, notwithstanding that to do so was virtually allowing the wife to testify against Jenks. Verdict of guilty.
Motion for a new trial.
Reamer, for Commonwealth.
Stickler, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mundy, J. The testimony rendered by X at the trial of the accused - such testimony having been revealed by the accused's wifewas virtually the testimony of the wife.
Apparently the presentment of this testimony was violative of
the Act of May 11, 1911, sec. 1, P. L. 269 providing - "Nor shall husband or wife be competent to testify against each other, except in
proceedings for maintenance and desertion, and in criminal proceedings against either for bodily injury or violence attempted, done or
threatened upon the other, and except also that either shall be competent merely to prove the fact of marriage in support of a criminal
charge of adultery alleged to have been committed by or with the
other." The present statement of facts is not embraced within any
of the enumerated exceptions.
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However, counsel for the Commonwealth cites Welker vs. New
York Central Railroad Co., 275 Pa. 82, where the wife actuated by
malicious vindication, volunteered incriminating information, which
was relayed in court by a third person, resulting in the husband's conviction. Such testimony was declared competent.
Obviously such procedure is a flagrant evasion of the statute as
it provides the anomalous situation of validating incompetent evidence by the method of offering" such testimony by proxy and ignoring the source. The logical justification of such a machination is beyond our comprehension.
By the adoption of 275 Pa. 82 (and not by desire) we are constrained to deny the motion for a new trial.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
X was an important witness against Jenks. He went to Jenks'
house and there saw some of the goods that had been stolen. He
would not have seen them, had Jenks' wife not displayed them. The
presence of these goods was important evidence of their having been
taken, by Jenks. It is supposed by the defendant, that allowing the
proof of the presence of the goods was virtually allowing the wife to
testify against her husband. With this view disagrees Commonwealth
vs. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, where it is said that the facts learned by a
competent witness, are not to be excluded because he may have been
put on the track of them by information coming from the wife. Mr.
Justice Frazer, in Welker vs. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 275 Pa. 82.,
remarks, "there is no rule of law which prevents a third person from
instituting criminal proceedings based on facts learned through information given by the wife of the accused. The admission of such
facts in evidence is not permitting the wife to testify against her
husband." It clearly is not. The weight of the testimony does not
repose on the wife's assertion. The witness recognizes the articles,
sdes them at the house of the defendant: so testifies. His creditability, not the wife's, is the force which gives value to the testimony.
Judgment is affirmed.
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ESTATE OF JOHNSON
Trusts Created by Will -

Charitable Use

Trustees to Appoint Beneficiaries

-

-

Failure of Testamentary

Appointment by Person

Selected by Orphans' Court

Thompson's
Estate, 282 Pa. 30 Cited With Approval

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Johnson bequeathed one-half of his property to specified persons.
His will directed that his executors should divide the other half in as
many parts, equal or unequal, as they chose and all of such parts be
given to churches, hospitals, public libraries, as it seemed proper to
them to select. Both executors died not having made the decision or
selection. The will suggested that one of the beneficiaries should be
the X Library Association. The administrators d. b. n., having filed
an account, this association petitions the court to appoint someone to
make the designations of beneficiaries. The next of kin resist claiming that, as to the one-half of the estate Johnson had died intestate.
Mark, for Plaintiff.
Mundy, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Lescure, J. This case presents two questions. The first question
is whether the trust created by the decedent in his will for charitable
purposes, was rendered ineffective because of uncertainty in describing the objects intended to be promoted and the persons or institutions who were to share in the fund created.
The fact that no fixed charity is described, the power of selection and power of discretion having been granted by the decedent to
the executors, does not render the trust ineffective, for that which is
capable of being rendered certain must be treated as being sufficiently
definite, Dulles' Estate, 218 Pa. 162; Murphy's Estate, 194 Pa. 310.
Nor does the failure of the decedent to set forth particular plans
for the carrying out of his intentions as to the charitable bequests,
render such bequests void.
The second question presented is whether a trustee could be appointed to carry out the desires of the testator, those designated to
make the selection of beneficiaries having died without exercising
the powers conferred upon them by the will.
A trust whether religious, literary, or scientific does not fail for
want of a new trustee, if the general intent to dispose of the estate is
evident and there remains only the necessity of having some one to

zo6
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carry out the purposes, Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30; Steven's Estate, 200 Pa. 318.
Under the enactments now in force, the survivor of trustees may
exercise the discretion granted by the will, and if all those named by
the testator to choose the beneficiary die, the court may appoint others to carry out the purposes contemplated.
In Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, which is a case similar to the
case at bar, Justice Sadler held that the Court has jurisdiction to appoint a new trustee; that such trustee shall have the power to carry
out all the intentions of the decedent as designated in the will; and
that the next of kin have no claim whatever to that portion of the estate in trust for charitable benefits.
In view of the above stated reasons and decisions cited, we decide in favor of the petitioner.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
If A. should by what he terms a will ,direct a priest X., to appoint his estate, according to his discretion as respects portions and
beneficiaries, there might be doubt of the validity of the instrument
as a will. It would seem to be a devolution on X. of the function of
disposing of A's property.
There is a special interest on the part of the courts in the preservation of charitable gifts.. It is apparently conceded that a gift by
A., in what he denominates his will, to B. of the power of selecting
recipients of portions of his estate, and of determining the quantities
of the estate so bestowed, is valid, if the gifts are to be charitable.
This may be because the need of charity is so great, and the supply
of it so meager. In Thompson Estate, 282 Pa. 30, the will, after making gifts to certain persons, gave to the executors power to convert
the remainder of the property, and "full and unlimited power" to divide the proceeds as they chose, and to allot the portions to "such religious and charitable purposes * * * as in their descretion," and
"as in their judgment are in accord with my (testator's) wishes." He
added that he included among the institutions to which distribution
may be made, the Memorial Free Library of Alexandria.
The executors did not make the allotment. One renounced, the
other died, having made no disposition of the charitable part of the
estate. The court, in a careful and elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice
Sadler, approved of a selection by the Orphans' Court, of a certain
member of the bar, for the purpose of making allocations, and the
decree of the Orphans' Court adopting these allocations, was affirmed.
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The X Library Association, having been suggested in the will as
one of the institutions to be elected to share in the fund,
petitions the court to appoint one to make the selections of
beneficiaries and to determine the amounts to be given to each. Despite the objection of the next of kin that the deceased has, as respects this portion of his estate, died intestate, and that it must therefore be divided among them according to the intestate law, the learned court below has decided it will appoint a person to make the allotments contemplated by the testator. The authority for this act is incontestable, and the appeal is dismissed.

PACE VS. RODGERS
Negligence

-

Master and Servant

-

Infant Injured While Riding

on Master's Wagon, Driven by Servant - Trespass for
Injuries - Liability of Master

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rodgers, a merchant, delivered goods to Pace by means of a
horse drawn wagon, driven by X, an employee. While the wagon
was at Pace's home, his boy, four years old, clambered into it. When
X was leaving the Pace home, he discovered the boy in the wagon,
but intending to give him a ride of a few rods, allowed him to remain. Rodgers had forbidden allowing anyone on the wagon. Forgetting the boy for a few minutes, he then recalled him, and looking
behind, discovered that he was missing. He had climbed from the
wagon and had been injured in falling to the ground. This is a suit
for damages by the boy and his father. Verdict for the plaintiffs.
Angle, for Plaintiff.
Lesclire, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bobick, J. In order to arrive at a definite and conclusive decision in the present case this court will have to assume that the lower
court found that the driver, X, was guilty of negligence. If there
was no negligence, there could, of course, be no liability either against
,the defendant or against the driver. The fact that the child was only
four :'ears old, is important only in so far as it shows conclusively
that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
But the negligence of the servant and nothing more is insufficient to affix liability on the master. The plaintiff must show not
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only that the servant has committed a tort, but also that the tort was
committed while he was acting within the scope of his employment
and in his master's business.
In the case at bar, the master had expressly forbidden the servant to allow anyone on the wagon. But even in spite of this express
prohibition, if X was acting within the scope of his employment and
in his master's business he will be liable for the torts of X.
Judge Grier, in writing for the Supreme Court of the United
States in Phila. Railway Co. vs. Derby, 14 Howard 468, says: "We
find no case which asserts the doctrine that the master is not liable
for the acts of his servant in his employment, when the particular
act causing the injury was done in disregard of general orders or
special command of the master." But when the servant quits sight of
the object for which he is employed and without having in view, his
master's orders, pursues that which his own whim suggests, he no
longer acts in pursuance of the authority given to him and in the
scope of the employment intrusted to him and the master will not be
liable for such an act.
Whether the tortious conduct of the servant is within the scope
of his employment and in his business is ordinarily a question of fact
and where the evidence is conflicting and fairly warrants more than
one inference, the question is submitted to and is decided by a jury
under proper instructions, but where the question is so clear as to admit but one answer it must be disposed of by the court.
The servant in this case was engaged as a teamster. He was
authorized to all acts which were consistent with his employment. A
review of the facts as disclosed by the record shows clearly that the
driver of the wagon had no implied authority to carry the plaintiff's
child. In fact he had been expressly forbidden to do so. He was not
engaged in the furtherance of his master's business, and even if negligent could impose no liability on the defendant. He was undoubtedly
engaged in work of the employer but he was acting beyond the scope
of his employment. In Perrin vs. Glassport Lumber Co., 276 Pa. 8, a
case similar in all respects to the case at bar, the court gave a directed verdict for the defendant and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
sustained the verdict. On this case as in that case, the facts are so
clear as to admit of but one inference, and under these circumstances
it is the duty of the court and not the jury to draw that inference,
and so we hold that the defendant's servant was not acting within
the scope of his employment when he committed the tort and as a
result the defendant cannot be held liable.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that if we hold that the defendant is not liable in this case it will destroy all the protection that
is due to infants from the traveling public. But is the court to take
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into consideration only the fact that the plaintiff was an infant and
upon proof of this fact impose an absolute liability upon the defendant? Certainly not. The defendant may, in some cases, be under a
duty to exercise a high degree of care in respects to infants but his
liability is by no means absolute.
Again, if the servant commits a tort which is not within the
scope of his employment the defendant is not left without a remedy in
such case even though the master is not liable but he must bring his
action directly against the servant and not the master. The law will
not permit a tort feaser to hide behind the command of his master.
This question, however, has not been raised in the present case and
its determination is unnecessary.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
For what should the defendant be liable? Not because hd owned
the wagon. Not because a child had climbed into it, and in attempting to leave it had fallen. The child was not cajoled or inveigled into
the wagon. The driver of the wagon, perceiving him in, did not instantly compel his departure. How could that tolerance be attributed
to the employer, nor even if so attributed, was it the cause of the injury. The impulses of the child, not awakened by any enticement or
encouragement of the driver, led to the act which caused his injury.
We cannot find that the failure of the driver to induce the boy to
leave by force or persuasion, earlier, was negligent; nor that having
tolerated the presence of the boy for a brief time, he should have
kept him under constant oversight. Nor could we, even though failure to do this was negligent, say that it occurred in the performance
of the work for which he was employed. The case cited by the learned court below justifies the result declared by it. Affirmed.

RALSTON VS

RAILWAY CO.

Negligence

Collision Between Street Car and Motor Truck
jury to Guest on Truck - Contributory Negligence

-

In-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ralston was invited to ride in a truck by its driver, but against
the instructions of the owner of the truck, of which he had no knowledge. The driver approaching the crossing of the street on which he
was traveling with another and on which the defendant's tracks were,
negligently continued his course until his truck collided with the car
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of the defendant. The result was the death of Ralston, a boy of about
fifteen years of age. Ralston's father sues for damages. Defence is
that the truck driver's negligence caused the collision and that the
boy was himself negligent in not objecting to the driver's continuing
to drive towards the car. The purpose of the driver to attempt to
cross the track was not revealed until he was within six or eight feet
of the track. Verdict for $4,000.
Mirkin, for Plaintiff.
Cherry, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Miss Cohn, J. Although a guest is not required to exercise the
same degree of care and watchfulness as the driver, and the carelessness of the latter is not imputed to the former, yet a passenger must
bear the consequences of his own negligence; when he joins in testing a danger but the extent to which one, in the position of a guest
should appreciate an impending peril, and act in relation thereto, depends upon the facts peculiar to each case. Unless these are manifest
and the inference to be drawn therefore clear beyond peradventure,
the issue must be submitted to the jury for determination, 267 Pa.
204.
The contention that the truck driver's negligence caused the collision is of importance to us only in determining whether the boy
was himself negligent in not objecting to the driver's continuing to
drive towards the car.
In 276 Pa. 178, the plaintiff's son was injured in a right angled
collision between a street car and a motor truck on which he. was riding as a guest. The truck driver was running his car at five to eight
miles an hour. He gave warning of his approach to the crossing
by sounding his horn. His speed was such as to convey to the mind
of the guest the car was under perfect control which in fact it was.
When the truck passed the house-line the street car was fifteen or
twenty feet away; notwithstanding the imminent danger, the driver
continued to the track and collided with the street car which was
approaching the street intersection at a high rate of speed without
warning. The truck driver was held guilty of negligence in not stopping. The learned court said: "The driver negligently drove to the
tracks, but we cannot declare as a matter of law, under the facts as
here presented that any act on the part of the guest was necessary,
especially when the car at all times was traveling under control.
These facts bring the case within the class that must be submitted
to the jury.'! The judgment was affirmed.
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It is true as the learned counsel for the defendant contends that
in the case at bar there is no evidence to show that the driver slowed
down, or blew his horn as in the case cited, or had the car under perfect control. And we might further add-no evidence that the trolley
car was approaching at a high rate of speed without warning; nevertheless we cannot infer from the absence of these facts that the driver therefore failed to observe these regulations or that the street car
was operated in a careful manner.
The question of the negligence of the guest in not objecting to
the driver's continuing to drive towards the car was submitted to the
jury. In order to arrive at a verdict, it was necessary to determine
to what extent the driver was negligent, as the duty of th boy to
warn the driver was entirely dependent therein. The verdict of the
jury clearly showed that they believed the evidence preponderated in
establishing the fact that the boy was not guilty of negligence in failing to warn the driver and therefore of necessity, that the driver exercised the proper amount of care prior to the negligence in crossing.
As the evidence before us merely shows that the purpose of the
driver to attempt to cross the track was not revealed to his guest until he was within six or eight feet of the track and that the driver was
negligent in continuing his course; but fails to show the manner in
which the driver drove prior to his negligence or the manner in
which the street car was operated, we must, in the absence of evidence clearly preponderating to the contrary, hold the judgment of
the lower court to be correct.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A collision between a truck and the defendant's street railway car
has occurred. An action against the defendant has been brought. The
mere fact of collision does not put a liability on it. Was it negligent?
If not, there is no duty on it to make compensation. The evidence is
entirely silent concerning the negligence of the defendant Hence
there is no liability.
Had there been liability, the question of contributory negligence
would have demanded an answer. Nothing shows negligence on the
part of the plaintiff's son in not controlling or attempting to control
the truck-driver. The boy was under no duty to imagine that the
driver would drive on and risk a contact with the street car. It would
be impossible, then, to charge the boy with negligently contributing
to the fatal injury. But, the innocence of the boy would impose no
liability on the defendant unless its negligence caused the damage.
That it did is non-apparent. 'Quod non apparet, non est.' We are
obliged therefore to disagree with the result attained by the learned
court below. Judgment reversed.
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COMMONWEALTH VS. GLENN
Criminal Law -

Trial for Murder -

Reference to a Former Convic-

tion of Crime by Prosecuting Officer
Juror

-

-

Withdrawal of

Wife's 'Statements Merely
Hearsay Evidence

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial for killing his wife. Plea, insanity. Examining witness X,
who has related the incident, the prosecuting officer asks, "Was that
after he, had been convicted as assault on X?"
The court refused to allow the defence to prove that on several
occasions the wife had said that Glenn had done several things indicative of insanity. The court told the jury not to pay heed to the
question about the assault on X but refused to arrest the trial by
withdrawing a juror. Conviction of murder. Appeal.
Berger, for Plaintiff.
Bickel, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bobkowski, J. Counsel for the accused petitions this court asserting two allegations as justification for the rendition of a new trial.
In consideration of the first assignment, the following question
was asked a witness: "Was that after he (the accused) had been
convicted for an assault on X?" Counsel for the defence objected,
contending that the question was prejudicial to the interest of the
defendant, and that the commission or conviction of a former crime
or crimes could not be introduced, at a subsequent trial. The lower
court erroneously overruled the objection. Such an incompetent
question would tend to bias the jury. A juror should have been
withdrawn, in compliance with the defendant's request, necessitating
a continuation of the case.
In Commonwealth vs. Gibson, 275 Pa. 338, presenting facts synonomous with those under consideration, such testimony was declared
incompetent with the further qualificatibn "that a juror should be
withdrawn and the case continued."
This elaborate opinion was quoted and confirmed in Com. vs.
Mozzorilla, 279 Pa. 465, reiterating the established precedent that any
evidence introducing the commission of another distinct and independent crime is incompetent.
In reference to the disqualification of the defendant's wife, testimony concerning his peculiarities indicative of his insanity, the lower
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court was correct, for it was also enunciated in Commonwealth vs.
Gibson, 275 Pa. 338, that such testimony was mere hearsay and not
being part of the res gestae was inadmissible.
In view of the first irregularity averred the judgment is reversed
and a venire facias de novo is granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The reference of the prosecuting officer to a conviction of assault
of the defendant, was improper. It suggested that another crime had
been committed by the defendant, and thus violated the principle that
when one is on trial for crime X, it is not proper to bring to the attention of the jury the fact that he has been guilty of crime Y.
Doubtless the wife could have been examined as to the mental
state of the defendant, but she was not thus examined. She had
made statements out of court and it was the making of these statements, that was offered to be proved. Theywere mere hearsay. The
decision of the learned court below is affirmed.

ROLAND VS. SAMUELS
Damages - Breach of Agreement to Exchange Stocks - Correct
Measure of Damages to be Awarded to Plaintiff
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Roland agreed with Samuels to exchange shares of stock in corporations; he to deliver five (5) shares in the X corporation, for
Samuel's four (4) shares in the Y corporation. The exchange was to
be made in three (3) days, but on the second day, Samuels notified
Roland that he would not carry out the arrangement. No evidence of
difference of values in the stocks since the making of the contract
was shown. The Court gave intimation that the measure of damages
was the difference of the value of the Y corporation shares, and that
of the X corporation shares.
Morris, for Plaintiff.
Neil, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Perrella, J. The question presented in the case at bar is one of
damages. Is the plaintiff entitled to merely nominal damages, or
may he recover the difference of the value of the Y corporation
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shares and the X corporation shares? The lower court has intimated
that the latter is the correct measure of damages.
In the case at bar Samuels repudiated his agreement with Roland
to exchange stock, thereby giving Roland an immediate right of action for damages, according to the Pennsylvania cases, Zuch vs. Mc•Clure, 98 Pa. 541; Aetna Explosives Co. vs. Diamond Alkali Co., 277
Pa. 399.
Had the contract here been for the sale of goods, the defendant's contention that the measure of damages is the difference between the contract and the market value, and if there is no difference, then merely nominal damages would be tenable, for the reason
that the vendee could. use his money to buy the same goods in open
market.
However, the contract here is for the exchange of stock and the
plaintiff can recover whatever damages he might sustain by reason of
failing to receive benefits which might have accrued to him by the
performance of the agreement.
In our opinion, Alexander vs. Soulas, 269 Pa. 423, is strictly analagous to the case at bar. There the court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover the difference between the value of the securities
the defendant agreed to give him less those the plaintiff agreed to
give to the defendant, each being the value at the time of breach by
the defendant.
In view of the foregoing authorities, we therefore, affirm judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Had the exchange of shares of stock been accomplished, in conformity with the agreement Roland would be the owner of the shares
in the Y corporation, but in becoming such he would have lost the
ownership of the shares in the X corporation. It is sensible then, to
apply the rule announced in Alexander vs. Soulas, 269 Pa. 423, "The
true measure of (Roland's) damages, was the value of the securities
the defendant agreed to deliver to the plaintiff, less the value of the
securities plaintiff engaged to deliver to defendant, each being valued
as of the date of the breach of the contract by defendant."
The learned court below has adopted this measure of damages.
Its judgment is therefore affirmed.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
DONNELLY'S ESTATE
Parent and Child - Adoption - Rights of Adopted Children
to Take Under Gift by Will to Children of

-

Not

Adopting Parent-Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the next of kin of John Donnelly from a
decision of the Orphans' Court concerning the payment of the income from the estate of John Donnelly, deceased, wherein the Court
directed part of the income received by the trustee to be paid to the
appellee.
The evidence submitted by the appellee in the court below and
upon which the decision was based, is as follows:
John Donnelly's will appointed X trustee of land, to pay the income to his three children equally during their lives, and on the death
of any of them, to pay the income he had received to such prersons of
kin to such child, as he should appoint by will; in default of such appointment, to pay to the children of such deceased -child. One of
Donnelly's children was Charles. Charles has died. His will directed the income from his father's estate to be paid to his adopted
son. He had no children. The adopted son claims the income which
Charles Donnelly had been receiving prior to his death.
Sheaffer, for Appellants.
Speakman, for Appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT
I. S. Rahn, J. The question that presents itself in this case is:Can an adopted child take under the will of a third person when he is
not so designated by name? According to the will of John Donnelly
each child had the power of appointment by will to name such persons of kin to him who were to receive his income at his death.
Charles, one of Donnelly's children, appointed his adopted son to receive his income when he died. But, however, his appointment failed
according to Roger's Estate, 218 Pa. 431. It has been held consistently
in Pennsylvania Courts that the word "kin" applies only to issue of the
body and not to adopted children. According to the Intestate Act of
June 7, 1917, Sec. 16 (b) and the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403
the adopted son of Charles could take under John Donnelly's will.
But in Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178 the court said: "that although as
between an adopted child and the adopting parent, the child will be
given, under our statutes, the same rights in the parents' estate as
he would take had he been born of the latter, this does not make him
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an actual child of the adopting parent, and ordinarily will not be entitled to take under the will of a third party who died before December 31, 1917, the date when the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403
went into effect."
The counsel for the appellee has in no manner offered evidence
to show that John Donnelly, the testator, died subsequent to December 31, 1917, at which time the Wills Act went into effect allowing an
adopted child to take under the will of a third party, or that the child
was adopted by Charles before John Donnelly made his will. It is
stated in Weider vs. Miller, 52 Super. 198; and Rice vs. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 408 that when evidence is not submitted which is
within the power of the party to submit, it will be presumed that the
same was against his interest. It is therefore to be presumed that
since no evidence has been offered to the contrary, that John Donnelly died prior to the taking effect of the Wills Act December 31,
1917. Since under this Act an adopted child cannot take under the
will of a third party who has died before December 31, 1917, Charles
Donnelly's adopted son cannot take under the will of John Donnelly.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that judgment should be granted
in favor of the appellant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Donnelly by will gives one third of the proceeds of the investment of his property, to son Charles during his life. On Charles'
death these proceeds from the third were to be paid to the kin of
Charles that he might appoint by will. If no appointment was made,
the proceeds were to be paid to the children of Charles.
Charles died, leaving no issue to survive him. The original testator has said that the proceeds are to be paid to such of Charles' kin,
as he might appoint. Charles has appointed, but the appointee is not
of kin, unless we understand the word "kin" to embrace, beside blood
relatives, persons adopted by Charles with the intention to bestow
on them the status, for the purpose of acquiring property by devise,
of blood relatives.
If the will was written before the Wills Act of 1917, the doctrine
applies that Charles' act cannot change for John Donnelly, the meaning of the term, "kin." If the will had been written since that act,
the intention of the testator would be inferred to be that, as Charles
treated the person adopted as a son, so should the testator be understood to treat him. But, it does not appear that the will was written
since the act of 1917 went into operation. That will must receive
the interpretation it would have received, had the act of 1917 not
been enacted, Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 17&
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The well written opinion of the learned court below well dispenses of the questions involved. Appeal dismissed.

AMOS VS. X RAILWAY CO.
Negligence

-

Street Railways

-

Evidence

man as a Part of Res Gestae -

-

Declaration of Motor.

Evidence

-

Inferences

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant's line ran through Amos's farm at one point.
There was a crossing from one to the other side of the track. On a
dark day, the sight being obscured by bushes along the track, Amos's
son while crossing the track, was run into and killed. This is an action for his death. No negligence is alleged save the omission to
blow the whistle. A son, Charles, testified that he was called to by
the motorman just after the accident and told that thinking it was
Charles he had seen near the track and whom he knew to be careful,
he had not blown the whistle. This was the only evidence that the
whistle was not blown. The court gave instructions for the defendant.
Shay, for Plaintiff.
Slotkin, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Smith, J. The main questions in this case which come up for
decision are; (1) whether or not the motorman was negligent, and (2)
whether contributory negligence may be imputed to the deceased.
There is no doubt about the deceased having a right to use the
crossing in question, so we arrive at the point which is raised by the
learned counsel for the defence as imputing contributory negligence
to the deceased. It is contended by the defence that there is a dutyon
every person attempting to traverse a railroad crossing to "stop, look
and listen" in support of which they cite Serfas vs. N. Eng. R. R. Co.,
270 Pa. 306. This rule we concede is true, but since death has sealed
the lips of the victim, and no one knows what he did as he attempted
to cross, and what the situation was from his point of view, the law
presumes that he did his duty. as all presumptions are in his favor,
Kelly vs. Director General of H. R., 274 Pa. 470. And to rebut this
presumption, positive evidence to the contrary must be shown, and
since no such evidence appears from the facts, the presumption prevails, Hugo vs. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co., 238 Pa. 594. The case re-
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lied on by the defence, Kemmler vs. Penn'a Co., 265 Pa. 212 to show
that the deceased was negligent in having walked directly in front of
their trolley, differs from that cited. In that case the deceased had
ample view to observe the slowly approaching train, whereas, in the
case at bar, the view was obstructed and the day dark. Hence no
negligence is proven on the part of the deceased.
But there is a binding duty upon all engineers and motormen to
give a warning by blowing their whistle as they approach crossings,
and it was held in Wingert vs. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 212
that a warning at a distance of 100 yards from the crossing was inadequate under particular circumstances. In the case at bar there is
testimony that the motorman himself admitted at the time of the
accident that he did not blow his whistle at all, and if this fact is
established it would amount to negligence on his part and the defendants would be liable, according to the rule laid down in Giberson vs. Patterson Mills Co., 174 Pa. 369, which holds "that there is a
well established rule, that declarations of an agent or employee, made
at the time of the particular transaction which is the subject of inquiry and while acting within the scope of his authority, may be given in evidence against his principal, as part of the res gestae.
The question, whether or not the motorman blew his whistle, is a
question of fact for the jury to decide, Thomas vs. Penn'a R. R. Co.,
275 Pa. 579. The declaration of the motorman immediately after the
accident, that he failed to blow the whistle, together with his reason
is part of the res gestae and admissible as evidence against defendants, Thomas vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 275 Pa. 579. The cases of Brown vs.
Kittanning Clay P. Co. in 259 Pa. 267, and Giberson vs. Patterson
Mills Co. in 174 Pa. 369, which the defence cites as authority for their
contention that "declarations made by an agent after an accident are
inadmissible against their employers," differs somewhat from the case
at bar. In those cases, several days had elapsed between the time
of the accident and the time of their making of the statements,
whereas, here, they were made spontaneously, and as such, admissible.
The defendants also maintain that the witness for the plaintiff
had been inattentive at the time of the accident and could not have
heard a whistle blown. That fact is immaterial, because the witness
does not testify from his personal knowledge in this case. What the
witness did testify to was the declarations of the motorman to him
at the time of the accident, that he did not blow his whistle, and
since such declarations were admissible as part of the res gestae, they
are entitled to great weight by the jury, as against his testimony at
the trial, that he did blow.
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It was error for the trial court to give instructions for the defendant, since the declarations of the motorman were admissible in evidence, and the question of blowing submitted to the jury, justifies instructions to the jury for the plaintiff because a court is only justified in giving binding instructions for the defendant, when, admitting
all evidence submitted by the plaintiff to be true, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover.
In view of the foregoing facts and authorities, we render judgment for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
For the death of the plaintiff's son, the defendant is liable only
if it was caused by negligence, without contributory negligence of the
son.
Negligence of the son does not appear. It is to be assumed that
he exercised the normal amount of care, until evidence that he did
not, is offered. That he did not see the approaching car is accounted
for by the darkness of the day and the bushes along the track. Vision
of the car being prevented, dependence was necessarily put on the
instructions of the ear, in deciding whether a car was coming. The
blowing of the whistle, a usual notification of the oncoming of a
train or car was of vital importance. Was it blown? We should assume that it was in absence of evidence. The only evidence is the
fact that, just after the accident, the motorman stated that he had
not blown the whistle, giving a reason for his omission to blow it.
This evidence is admissible, not because the person making the
statement was the motorman. As such, he could not by his declaration, affect his employer. It was made immediately after the accident while the motorman was under the influence of the ghastly occurrence, before he had time or opportunity to consider the legal effects of the fact that he was stating, upon anybody. It was a "part of
res gestae of the accident," Meyer vs. Pittsburgh, M. & B. Railway,
273 Pa. 363 and as such admissible.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
BANK VS. SCROPE
Promissory Notes - Negotiable Instruments - Accommodation Note
- Necessity of Notice to Indorser of Dishonor and Exceptions - Evidence - Act of May 16, 1901,
Section 115 P. L. 194

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A note for $1000 made payable to Scrope, by Scrimmons was
made for Scrope's accommodation. The bank discounted it. The
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note was not paid at maturity. This is an action on the indorsement
against Scrope. He defends, denying that the note was made for his
accommodation; and proving that he received, as an indorser, no notice of the dishonor of the note. The court said that no notice of dishonor was necessary, if the note was made for Scrope's accommodation.
Dimona, for Plaintiff.
Dougherty, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Cassone, J. The single question to be considered in this appeal
is this: need notice of the dishonor of a promissory note because of
the maker's non-payment at maturity be given by the holder to an
indorser where the instrument was made for indorser's accommodation? .
It has for a long time been the law that an indorser of a note,
unless qualified, becomes liable to pay the amount demanded by the
instrument upon failure of the maker of the note, upon due notice of
such failure, to the holder or any subsequent indorsee who legally
claims through the particular indorser. It has been the common
commercial rule that such indorsers of notes or other negotiable paper are bound and may be sued after maturity upon demand and notice of the non-payment or other default of the maker.
Section 89, Negotiable Instrument Act of 1901, P. L. 194, takes
cognizance of this rule and provides for the discharge from liability
of those who are not so notified.
However, several exceptions exist to this rule; the case at bar
falling directly within one of them. Where it appears that the maker
of the note has lent his name for the mere use and accommodation of
the indorser, such notice need not be given to the indorser.
Accommodation paper is promissory notes or bills of exchange
made, accepted or indorsed without any consideration therefor. A
common illustration would be a note made to get from a vendor a
credit which might otherwise have been refused and the goods are
sold to the indorser on the joint credit of the maker and indorser.
In such cases the equitable relation subsisting between maker
and indorser is that of surety and principal, and the indorser, in an
action against him on the indorsement, has no right to complain that
his surety has not been pursued first before he was called upon for
payment and therefore requires no notice, 25 Pa. 61. The indorser
having received the full benefit of the note is not injured.
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This exception to the general rule of notice of dishonor is incorporated into the Negotiable Instrument Act, supra, section 115.
While there are no cases since the taking effect of this act directly in point on this question, a dicta by Frazer, J., in 276 Pa. 199,
a case in which facts similar to these were at issue, holds that when a
note is made for the indorser's accommodation, notice to him of dishonor was not required under section 115 of the Act. This case decided in 1922 renders an affirmation of the judgment below imperative, in view of the long established law and recent legislation in favor
of the plaintiff..
The counsel for the defendant has sought to create as an issue
the question of whether or not the note was made for Scrope's accommodation. The appellant contends that according to sec. 24 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act, supra, every person whose signature appears on a note is prima facie presumed to have become a party thereto for value. The section holds that every negotiable instrument is
deemed to have been issued for a valuable consideration.
But here the facts placed before us in the appellee's brief state
that the note was made for Scrope's accommodation, by Scrimmons,
and that it was discounted by the bank, and not paid at maturity
whereupon the bank sued Scrope.
The counsel for the appellant further contends that his denial
in the court below raised a question of fact for the jury. It seems to
us that the question was properly placed before the jury. The court
charged that no notice of dishonor was necessary, if, the note was
made for Scrope's accommodation.
We find no error and affirm the judgment of the lower court.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Where a man is liable to pay a note only on the default of another person, the failure of that person to make the payment must be
early communicated to him. This is a reasonable provision of the law.
On the other hand, when the primary duty is on him, to make the
payment, he has no right to assume that some one other than himself, is making the payment, and he knows, without notification,
whether h6 has paid or not. It would be idle to require that a notice
be given him of that which he already knows, in order to complete
his liability to make payment. Sect. 115 of the Negt. Inst. Acts of
1901, p. 209 provides that notice of dishonor is not required to be given
to an indorser "where the instrument was made or accepted for his
accommodation." Cf. Park Bank vs. Naffah, 276 Pa. 199.
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The note was made payable to Scrope for his accommodation.
He could not collect the money named in the note from the maker.
The bank has become purchaser of it, but was not obliged to perfect
Scrope's liability, by telling him a fact which he already knew that,
being under an absolute duty to pay the note, he has failed to- pay it.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

